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This article discusses judicial and legislative developments relating to
the Texas law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other
estate planning matters during the Survey period of December 1, 2018,
through November 30, 2019. The reader is warned that not all newly
enacted statutes or decided cases during the Survey period are presented,
and not all aspects of each statute or case are analyzed. You must read
and study the full text of each statute or case before relying on it or using
it as precedent. The discussion of most cases includes a moral, that is, the
important lesson to be learned from the case. By recognizing situations
that resulted in time-consuming and costly litigation in the past, the
reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of the same situations arising
with his or her clients.
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I. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
The 2019 Texas Legislature clarified the computation of the surviving
spouse’s intestate share when there is at least one non-marital descendant
to prevent a misreading of the statute.1 Incorrectly, several attorneys and
judges argued that the statute gave the surviving spouse one-half of the
deceased spouse’s half of community property rather than providing that




In re Estate of Silverman demonstrates that a document that names an
executor may be deemed a valid will even if the document does not make
a property disposition.2 The decedent handwrote and signed a document
that provided, “Karen Grenrood is my executor, administrator, [and] has
all legal rights to my estate in the case of my untimely or timely death.”3
The contestants claimed that this document lacked testamentary intent
and thus is not a will that is admissible to probate.4 The trial court
agreed.5
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reversed.6 Consistent with
the Texas Supreme Court case of Boyles v. Gresham,7 the court of ap-
peals held that a document that appoints an executor can be a will even if
it does not make an effective disposition of the testator’s property.8 The
court also quoted the Texas Estates Code provision, which defines the
term “will” as including an instrument that merely appoints an executor.9
In addition, the court held that the decedent’s document is ambiguous
and could dispose of the entire estate to Karen by stating that she has “all
legal rights” to his estate.10 The court did not, however, order the docu-
ment admitted to probate because the contestants also alleged undue in-
fluence, an issue the trial court had yet to resolve.11
B. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
The most commonly appealed case during the Survey period involved
will interpretation and construction issues indicating that will drafters, be
1. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.003(c).
2. In re Estate of Silverman, 579 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, no pet.).
3. Id. at 734.
4. Id. at 735.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 741.
7. 263 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. 1954).
8. In re Estate of Silverman, 579 S.W.3d at 740.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 739–40.
11. Id. at 741.
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they attorneys or lay individuals, need to be precise about the language
used in their wills.
1. “Personal Effects”
The testatrix’s self-prepared will in In re Estate of Ethridge left her
“personal effects” to her nephew-in-law and did not contain a residuary
clause.12 Her nephew-in-law asserted that “personal effects” included
cash, receivables, and oil and gas interests and royalties.13 Instead, the
testatrix’s heirs asserted that this property passed to them via intestacy,
and the trial court agreed.14 The trial court also found that the nephew-
in-law, who was serving as the independent executor, misapplied estate
property and removed him.15 The nephew-in-law appealed.16
The Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed.17 After concluding
that the will was not ambiguous, the court of appeals explained that ex-
trinsic evidence is unnecessary and that her intent must be found within
the four corners of the will.18 The court rejected the nephew-in-law’s as-
sertion that the phrase “personal effects” was meant to encompass her
entire estate except for the devise of her homestead, which had
adeemed.19 The court explained that “personal effects” is a narrow subset
of personal property, including “articles bearing intimate relation or asso-
ciation to the person of the testator” such as clothing, jewelry, eyeglasses,
luggage, and similar items.20 The term would not encompass real prop-
erty, including mineral interests.21
2. Right of First Refusal
A testator granting a right of first refusal, which may be exercised over
only a portion of a tract of real property, needs to anticipate that the
person may select property which has the effect of reducing the value of
the remaining property. The testator should then indicate whether a reap-
praisal of the selected property is needed to determine the purchase
price. Failure to do so may raise issues such as those in Brewer v. Foun-
tain.22 The testator’s will and codicil provided that named individuals
would have the right of first refusal to purchase real property from the
estate at a “sales price equal to the Appraised value of the Real Prop-
erty” at the date of the testator’s death.23 These individuals exercised the
right to purchase some, but not all, of the real property using the value of
12. In re Estate of Ethridge, 594 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.).
13. Id. at 613.
14. Id. at 614.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 617.
18. Id. at 615.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 615–16.
21. Id. at 616.
22. 583 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
23. Id. at 874.
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the homestead plus a prorated amount for additional acreage.24 The part
they wanted to purchase was “better” than the remaining acreage be-
cause it included a lake and access road, which arguably would make the
remaining property less valuable.25 The trial court ordered a reappraisal
of just the property the individuals wanted to purchase, which resulted in
a price of more than 350% higher.26 The named individuals objected to
the new appraised value.27 The trial court ruled that the named individu-
als had the right to purchase all the real property at its appraised value,
but because they were purchasing less than the whole, they were entitled
to an offset reimbursement.28 However, no provision of the testator’s will
authorized this result.29
The First Houston Court of Appeals examined the testator’s will and
codicil and found them to be unambiguous.30 The court of appeals ex-
plained that the trial court’s resolution effectively required the named
individuals to purchase all of the land despite the clear language granting
them the right to purchase “any or all” of the property based on the value
at the date of the testator’s death.31 The court then held that the named
individuals may purchase any portion of the property based on the date
of death value “without regard to any diminution in value to the remain-
der of the property.”32
3. Partial Intestacy
A will drafter must carefully consider as many contingencies as possi-
ble when drafting dispositive provisions, as Sullivan v. Hatchett teaches.33
The testator’s will gave his surviving spouse a life estate in his property.34
However, he did not provide clear instructions as to what was to happen
after her death.35 One provision did provide for the disposition of 60% of
his estate, but only if certain conditions were satisfied, such as his wife
dying first, both dying at the same time, or his wife not surviving by
ninety days.36 The residual clause disposed of only 40% of the estate.37
Nonetheless, the trial court allowed 60% of the estate to pass under the
conditional provision even though none of the conditions actually
occurred.38
24. Id. at 875.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 875–76.
28. Id. at 875.
29. Id. at 876.
30. Id. at 877.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 878.
33. Sullivan v. Hatchett, No. 07-17-00296-CV, 2019 WL 545578 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Feb. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
34. Id. at *1.
35. See id. at *2.
36. Id. at *1.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *2–3.
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The Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed.39 None of the condi-
tions triggering disposition under the 60% provision applied, and the re-
siduary clause covered only 40% of the estate.40 Thus, 60% of the estate
passed by intestacy. It is likely that the testator intended the disposition
in the conditional provision to govern 60% of the estate after his wife’s
death. However, the unambiguous language of the provision prevented
that from occurring.41
The dissenting justice argued that the conditional provision should ap-
ply even if none of the conditions occurred because when the provision
disposing of 60% is combined with the residual clause disposing of 40%,
the testator’s estate is completely distributed without resorting to
intestacy.42
4. Codicil
If at all possible, avoid the use of codicils to prevent external integra-
tion issues, especially when modern computer technology makes it effi-
cient and inexpensive to create a new will. If a codicil is nonetheless used,
the testator must be certain to correctly reference the will which the testa-
tor is amending. Otherwise, problems such as those in In re Estate of Har-
grove may arise.43 The testatrix executed a will on February 13, 2017.44 A
month later on March 31, 2017, she executed a codicil to a will she exe-
cuted “in the Summer of 2016.”45 The trial court refused to admit the
codicil and its republication of the prior will, holding that the codicil did
not make a sufficient reference to a prior will.46
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.47 The court of
appeals explained that the codicil was not referencing the February 2017
will but rather one executed in the prior year.48 No evidence was intro-
duced with regard to the contents, or even existence, of the prior will.49
The court concluded, “The Codicil purporting to modify that nonexistent
will therefore has no validity or effect.”50
Even though the parties could not locate the prior will, this author
thinks the codicil should have been effective to the extent it changed pro-
visions of the February 2017 will. In effect, the codicil still revoked by
inconsistency certain terms of the 2017 will. Alternatively, the parties
39. Id. at *6.
40. Id. at *4.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *6–7 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
43. In re Estate of Hargrove, No. 04-18-00355-CV, 2019 WL 1049293 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Mar. 6, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
44. Id. at *1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *3.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id.
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could have sought reformation and attempted to prove the reference to
the will as being executed in 2016 was a scrivener’s error.51
C. WILL REFORMATION
If a personal representative petitions a constitutional county court for
will reformation and the county does not have a statutory probate court
or a county court at law exercising original probate jurisdiction, the judge
may now on the judge’s motion, and must on the motion of the party, (1)
request the assignment of a statutory probate judge, or (2) transfer the
proceeding to the district court.52 If a party requests the assignment of a
statutory probate judge before the judge on the judge’s motion transfers
the case to the district court, the judge must grant the motion for the
assignment of the statutory probate court judge.53
If a personal representative petitions a constitutional county court for
will reformation and the county does not have a statutory probate court
but does have a county court at law exercising original probate jurisdic-
tion, the judge may on the judge’s motion, and must on the motion of a
party, transfer the case to the county court at law.54
In both situations, the constitutional county court continues to exercise
jurisdiction over the management of the case other than the reformation
proceeding. Once the reformation issue is resolved, the statutory probate
court judge, district court, or county court at law returns the entire matter
to the constitutional county court for further proceedings.55
D. ANTI-LAPSE STATUTE AND CHARITABLE GIFTS
The 2019 legislature revised the anti-lapse statute to assure that it does
not apply to charitable gifts unless the testator expressly so provides.56
This revision removes a potential argument that the court could not use
cy pres to find an alternative charitable beneficiary upon the lapse of a
charitable gift.
E. UNDUE INFLUENCE
In re Estate of Russey demonstrates that it is difficult to overturn a trial
court’s determination of undue influence as long as there is sufficient evi-
dence even if that evidence could be subject to other interpretations.57
The trial court examined the evidence and determined that the testatrix’s
51. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.451.




56. Id. § 255.152(d).
57. In re Estate of Russey, No. 12-18-00079-CV, 2019 WL 968421, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Feb. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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will was invalid because it was executed while she was under undue influ-
ence.58 The Twelfth Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed.59
The court of appeals reviewed the evidence and determined it was le-
gally and factually sufficient to prove that the sole beneficiary, a non-
family member, had exerted undue influence over the testatrix.60 The
court based its analysis on the non-exhaustive ten-factor list of considera-
tions the Texas Supreme Court set forth in Rothermel v. Duncan.61 A few
of the many factors the court discussed, which showed the undue influ-
ence and the testatrix’s inability to resist, included: the beneficiary was
subject to deferred adjudication for theft and needed to repay almost
$40,000 in restitution which she had not done; the beneficiary had ac-
cused the testatrix of stealing from the beneficiary’s business for which
the testatrix had worked; the testatrix relied on the beneficiary for her
care and transportation during her last illness; the beneficiary worked to
keep the testatrix, her children and grandchildren estranged; and the ben-
eficiary printed the will, gave it to the testatrix to sign, and wrote the date
of the will.62
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. DESIGNATION OF ADMINISTRATOR
A testator may now grant another person (e.g., the named executor, a
specified person, or a person identified by office or function) “the author-
ity to designate one or more persons to serve as administrator of the tes-
tator’s estate.”63 Unless the testator otherwise provides, the designated
person may serve only if all the executors named in the will are deceased,
are disqualified to serve, or have filed affidavits stating their inability or
unwillingness to serve.64 To make the designation, the named person
must do so in writing and have that writing acknowledged.65 Of course,
the designated person must not be disqualified from serving.66 Unless the
will or designation provides otherwise, the designated person has all the
same rights, powers, and duties as an executor named in the will, includ-
ing the right to serve independently and sell property without the consent
of the distributees.67
58. Id. at *2.
59. Id. at *7.
60. Id. at *5.
61. Id. at *3. See generally Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 923 (Tex. 1963).
62. In re Estate of Russey, 2019 WL 968421, at *4–6.
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B. CONVERSION OF MUNIMENT OF TITLE TO ESTATE
ADMINISTRATION
The 2019 legislature provided that the fact that a will has already been
admitted to probate as a muniment of title will not preclude a later estate
administration as long as either (1) four years have not elapsed since the
testator died, or (2) the court determines that estate administration is
needed under Texas Estates Code § 301.002(b) (e.g., to recover property
due a decedent’s estate).68 Certain time periods for the court or personal
representative to take action will now run from the date the personal
representative qualifies rather than when the court admitted the will to
probate as a muniment of title (e.g., the giving of notice to the
beneficiaries).69
C. CUSTODY OF ORIGINAL WILL
The 2019 legislature clarified that the testator’s original will must re-
main in the custody of the county clerk unless (1) a court order authorizes
the temporary removal for inspection purposes, or (2) the entire case is
transferred to another court.70
D. DEFINITION OF “PROBATE PROCEEDING”
The 2019 legislature expanded the definition of “probate proceeding”
to encompass will modification and reformation proceedings.71
E. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE’S ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT
NON-PROBATE ASSETS
The 2019 legislature granted the personal representative the ability to
obtain information about non-probate assets such as multiple-party ac-
counts, property subject to non-testamentary transfers, and insurance
contracts even though these assets are not part of the probate estate.72
This access will make it easier for the personal representative to prepare
estate tax returns and ascertain whether the personal representative
should pursue these assets to pay debts and expenses.
F. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE PURSUANCE OF
MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS
The 2019 legislature made it clear that a personal representative has no
duty to seek funds from multiple-party accounts that pass outside of pro-
bate to pay debts or expenses unless a surviving spouse, a creditor, or a
person acting on behalf of the deceased party’s minor child makes a writ-
ten demand.73
68. Id. § 257.151.
69. Id. § 257.152.
70. Id. § 256.053(b).
71. Id. § 31.001.
72. Id. §§ 111.101–.102.
73. Id. § 113.252(c).
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G. PRO SE
In many counties, a non-attorney named as the independent executor
and sole beneficiary of a will is precluded from proceeding pro se to ad-
minister the testator’s estate. In In re Estate of Maupin, a husband ap-
pealed the trial court’s sua sponte order admitting his wife’s will to
probate as a muniment of title rather than granting him letters testamen-
tary as he had requested.74 The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s decision because the hus-
band was a non-lawyer proceeding pro se.75 The local court rules of
Travis County preclude a non-lawyer from acting pro se from administer-
ing the estate of a decedent even if the person is the sole beneficiary of
the decedent’s will.76
H. STANDING
In re Estate of Daniels makes it clear that a decedent’s spouse, heirs,
and devisees have standing regardless of whether they have a pecuniary
interest in the decedent’s estate.77 After the intestate died, a heated dis-
pute arose over whether his surviving spouse or his mother should serve
as the independent administrator.78 After the court determined heirship,
appointed his surviving spouse as the temporary administrator, and dis-
tributed all estate property to the heirs, the surviving spouse moved to
dismiss all actions of the other heirs on the ground that they lacked stand-
ing as they no longer had a property right in or claim against the intes-
tate’s estate.79 The trial court granted the motion.80
On appeal, the Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed.81 The court
of appeals carefully read the applicable Estates Codes provisions.82 An
“interested person” has standing to apply for and challenge an applica-
tion for letters of administration.83 The definition of “interested person”
includes “an heir.”84 An heir is “a person who is entitled under the stat-
utes of descent and distribution to a part of the estate of a decedent who
dies intestate.”85
Accordingly, it was undisputed that originally the intestate’s mother
and the other heirs had standing.86 The court of appeals rejected the
74. In re Estate of Maupin, No. 13-17-00555-CV, 2019 WL 3331463, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 25, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id.
77. In re Estate of Daniels, 575 S.W.3d 841, 848 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet.
denied).
78. Id. at 843.
79. Id. at 844.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 848.
82. Id. at 845–46.
83. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 301.051(2)(B), 301.101.
84. Id. § 22.018(l).
85. Id. § 22.015.
86. In re Estate of Daniels, 575 S.W.3d at 845.
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claim that when they lost a pecuniary interest in the estate that they lost
standing.87 The court of appeals explained that the language in Texas Es-
tates Code § 22.108 that includes a person who has a “property right in”
or a “claim against” does not restrict the standing of the other individuals
listed in the definition, such as heirs and devisees.88 The definition is in
the disjunctive; the statute uses the word “or” between the named catego-
ries of interested persons.89 Thus, the listed individuals do not need to
have a pecuniary interest in the estate to have standing.90
I. JURISDICTION
A party dissatisfied with a probate court order must take proper steps
either to timely (1) file a motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
329b, or (2) appeal. For example, in In re Estate of Brazda,91 the probate
court ordered the administrator to distribute certain funds and held the
administrator personally liable for damages resulting from the delay in
distributing under Texas Estates Code § 360.301.92 Later the same day,
the administrator moved to have the order reconsidered.93 Two weeks
later, the probate court granted the motion.94 At a hearing on the motion
several months later, the probate court entered orders reconsidering and
removing damages against the administrator.95 An heir appealed on the
ground that the trial court lost plenary power over the order before it
entered the reconsideration order.96
The First Houston Court of Appeals agreed.97 First, the court of ap-
peals decided it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the reconsidera-
tion because the orders are to be treated as an “undivided whole” and
thus final and appealable.98 Likewise, the court of appeals explained that
the original probate court order requiring the administrator to distribute
property and holding the administrator liable was final and not an inter-
locutory one.99 The order resolved all of the then-live claims, including
the awarding of damages.100 Accordingly, the probate court lost its ple-
nary power to reconsider the order or enter further inconsistent or-
ders.101 Instead, the administrator should have appealed. Note that the
court engaged in a detailed discussion of how the time for the court to
87. Id. at 846.
88. Id.
89. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.018(1).
90. See In re Estate of Daniels, 575 S.W.3d at 848.
91. 582 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
92. Id. at 720.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 720–21.
95. Id. at 721.
96. Id. at 721–22.
97. Id. at 732.
98. Id. at 729.
99. Id. at 730.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 731–32.
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undo an order after entering it may be extended.102 However, the new
trial court orders were entered even after the longest possible
extension.103
J. DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP
Under 2019 legislative revisions, a determination of heirship will now
normally require “two disinterested and credible witnesses.”104 However,
the court can determine that one disinterested and credible witness is suf-
ficient if a diligent search does not discover another witness.105 Although
it is typical that the witnesses knew the decedent and can thus explain the
decedent’s family situation, the statute does not require that any witness
personally knew the decedent, and thus, a genealogist’s or other re-
searcher’s testimony may be sufficient.106
In re Estate of Keener holds that a person claiming property as a trust
beneficiary has standing to intervene in a proceeding to declare heirship
when the heirs seek to inherit the same property.107 The beneficiary of
the decedent’s inter vivos trust filed a plea in intervention in an action to
determine the decedent’s heirs.108 The beneficiary claimed that he, as the
trust beneficiary, was the owner of property the heirs sought to inherit.109
The trial court said that the documents the decedent used to transfer
property to the inter vivos trust lacked testamentary intent—making
them ineffective—and that the trust was designed to transfer only a sup-
pressor (a gun “silencer”).110 Thus, the trial court denied the plea, hold-
ing that the beneficiary lacked a justiciable interest.111
The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals reversed
because the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion that it made
without reference to guiding rules and principles.112 The court explained
the fallacies with the trial court’s reasons for denying the plea.113 First,
testamentary intent is not needed to transfer property to an inter vivos
trust.114 Second, decedent could add property to the trust in any manner
and at any time because no trust terms restricted adding property to the
trust.115
102. See id. at 722–24.
103. See id. at 731–32.
104. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.151(b).
105. Id. § 202.151(c).
106. See id. § 202.151(b)–(c).
107. In re Estate of Keener, No. 13-18-00007-CV, 2019 WL 758872, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
108. Id. at *1.
109. Id. at *2.
110. Id. at *3.
111. Id.
112. See id. at *6–7.
113. Id. at *7.
114. Id. at *6.
115. Id. at *7.
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K. LATE PROBATE
In Ferreira v. Butler,116 the Texas Supreme Court held that a court
might consider only the applicant’s default in determining whether to
probate a will after four years.117 The executrix of the decedent’s estate
attempted to probate the will of the decedent’s wife nine years after her
death.118 The wife’s children from a previous relationship contested the
application asserting that it was too late to probate the wife’s will as more
than four years had elapsed since the wife’s death and that the applicant
lacked a good reason for not timely probating his wife’s will.119 The exec-
utrix responded that the four-year rule did not apply under Texas Estates
Code § 256.003 because she was not in default; she applied to probate the
will a mere one month after discovering the will.120 The trial court denied
probate, and the executrix appealed.121 The intermediate appellate court
affirmed.122 The court of appeals explained that the executrix’s timely
conduct was irrelevant.123 The important issue is whether the decedent
acted timely, which he clearly did not.124 The court explained that the
executrix, both in her personal capacity and in her representative capac-
ity, could have no greater right than the decedent had when he died.125
The court of appeals did, however, recognize that there is a split in au-
thority among the Texas appellate courts regarding whether a default by a
will beneficiary is attributed to that beneficiary’s successors in interest
(heirs or will beneficiaries).126
On appeal to the supreme court, the supreme court adopted the execu-
trix’s position that the statute clearly references whether “the applicant”
was in default, not whether someone else, even the person through whom
the applicant is claiming, was in default.127 The supreme court expressly
overruled Faris v. Faris, in which the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals had
imputed a devisee’s default to that person’s own devisee.128 However, the
supreme court did recognize that the executrix was “bound” by the dece-
dent’s default in her capacity as the decedent’s executrix, but she would
have her own standing as an interested person because, as a devisee
under the decedent’s will, she had a pecuniary interest that would be af-
fected by the probate of the decedent’s wife’s will which left property to
116. 575 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2019).
117. Id. at 338.




122. Ferreira v. Butler, 531 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017),
vacated, 575 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2019).
123. Id. at 342.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 343–34.
126. Id. at 342–44.
127. Ferreira v. Butler, 575 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Tex. 2019).
128. Id. at 338: see also Faris v. Faris, 138 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1940, writ
ref’d), overruled by Ferreira v. Butler, 575 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2019).
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the decedent.129 Accordingly, the supreme court vacated the appellate
court’s decision and remanded so the executrix could amend her plead-
ings to seek probate of the decedent’s wife’s will in her individual
capacity.130
L. TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION
Chabot v. Estate of Sullivan makes it clear that the probating of a will
as a muniment of title does not preclude a will contest within two years of
probate and the appointment of a temporary administration to serve
while the contest is pending.131 The testator’s will was admitted to pro-
bate as a muniment of title.132 Subsequently, tort actions were filed
against the testator’s estate.133 In addition, an unhappy heir filed a will
contest along with a request for the appointment of a temporary adminis-
trator.134 The trial court granted the request.135 Later, the trial court ap-
proved the temporary administrator’s settlement of the tort claims over
the objection of one claimant who appealed.136
The objecting tort claimant asserted that the court’s appointment of a
temporary administrator was void for want of jurisdiction, and thus, the
approval of the settlement was likewise void.137 The Third Austin Court
of Appeals rejected this argument.138 The court of appeals explained that
an interested person may contest a will within two years after it is admit-
ted to probate under Texas Estates Code § 256.204.139 The testator’s will
was contested timely.140 Thus, the court had authority under Texas Es-
tates Code § 452.051 to appoint a temporary administrator to serve while
the will contest was pending.141
M. COMMUNITY PROPERTY TRANSFER BY SURVIVING SPOUSE
In re Estate of Abraham serves as a reminder that a surviving spouse
wishing to transfer a community asset prior to the conclusion of the ad-
ministration must follow the procedures under Texas Estates Code
§ 360.253 to protect the rights of the deceased spouse’s creditors.142 The
decedent used a parcel of community property as collateral for a loan.143
129. Ferreira, 575 S.W.3d at 334–35.
130. Id. at 338–39.
131. Chabot v. Estate of Sullivan, 583 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet.
denied).




136. Id. at 759–60.
137. Id. at 760.
138. Id. at 762.
139. Id. at 761.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. In re Estate of Abraham, 583 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet.
denied).
143. Id. at 375.
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The decedent died before repaying the loan, and thus the creditor filed a
claim in the probate proceeding for the unpaid balance of the loan.144
Four months after the decedent’s death, his son filed a deed which pur-
ported to transfer this property from the decedent to him.145 The dece-
dent signed the deed, but it was not notarized until after the decedent’s
death.146 Two years later, the decedent’s surviving spouse and sole benefi-
ciary deeded her interest in this property to the son contingent on him
paying the creditor’s claim but without reference to the other debts of the
estate.147 The decedent’s spouse did not seek the court’s permission to
execute the deed, nor did she post a bond.148 The administrator sought to
set aside this deed because the court did not grant permission, there was
no partition order, and no bond was posted.149 The probate court agreed,
and the decedent’s spouse appealed.150
The Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed.151 The court of appeals
explained that, although title to the property immediately vested in the
spouse upon the decedent’s death under Texas Estates Code § 101.001, it
remained subject to the decedent’s non-exempt debts.152 In addition,
once a personal representative is appointed, the personal representative
has a superior right to possession of all estate property under Texas Es-
tates Code § 101.003.153 The court described methods for a beneficiary to
obtain property during the administration of an estate as well as for a
spouse to get title to her share of a community property assets under
Texas Estates Code § 360.253.154 The spouse did not follow any of these
procedures but claimed that the community property procedure in Texas
Estates Code § 360.253 is optional.155 The court explained that the proce-
dure is optional in the sense that the surviving spouse could wait until the
administration of the estate is complete to transfer the property and not
need to comply with this section.156 However, if the spouse wants to
transfer the property prior to the conclusion of the administration, the
formal procedure of partition and posting a bond is necessary to protect
estate creditors.157 Otherwise, the spouse could transfer the asset and
shield it from estate creditors.158
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 375–76.




151. Id. at 379.
152. Id. at 378–79.
153. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 101.003.
154. In re Estate of Abraham, 583 S.W.3d at 377–78.
155. Id. at 378.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 378–79.
158. Id. at 379.
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N. COMMUNITY PROPERTY TRANSFER BY DECEASED SPOUSE
A conveyance of community real property requires the signatures of
both spouses. Failure to obtain both signatures may raise issues such as
those in In re Estate of Abraham.159 Four months after the decedent’s
death, his son, who was not a beneficiary of the will, filed a deed which
purported to transfer a parcel of community property from the decedent
to him.160 The decedent signed the deed, but it was not notarized until
after the decedent’s death.161 Two years later, the decedent’s surviving
spouse and sole beneficiary deeded her interest in this property to the
son.162 Accordingly, the son claimed that he was now the owner of the
land, and the administrator sought to void the deed.163 The probate court
declared that the decedent’s deed was “void, invalid, and of no legal ef-
fect.”164 The son appealed.165
The Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed.166 The son claimed that
the late notarization would not make the deed invalid as notarization is
not a deed requirement under Texas Property Code § 5.021.167 Instead,
notarization is merely a precondition to recording the deed in the public
records under Texas Property Code § 12.001.168 The court determined
that it did not need to address this issue because the decedent’s wife did
not sign the deed and thus could not convey the property.169 “[A]bsent a
power of attorney or agreement, one spouse may not convey community
property to a third party, so as to effectuate a partition by creating a
tenancy-in-common between the remaining spouse and the third
party.”170 In addition, as explained in the companion case of In re Estate
of Abraham discussed above, the alleged transfer of the wife’s interest to
the son was also ineffective.171
O. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty need to be timely filed. Po-
tential plaintiffs must recognize, as Brown v. Arenson emphasizes, that
they are “charged with notice of the contents of the probate records” and
that “[c]onstructive notice in law creates an irrebuttable presumption of
159. See 583 S.W.3d 890, 898 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied).
160. Id. at 892.
161. Id.




166. Id. at 898.
167. Id. at 897. See generally TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.021 (requiring that a deed be
in writing and be subscribed and delivered by the conveyor or conveyor’s agent authorized
in writing).
168. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.001(a).
169. In re Estate of Abraham, 583 S.W.3d at 898.
170. Id. at 896 (citing Dalton v. Don J. Jackson, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1985, no writ)).
171. In re Estate of Abraham, 583 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied).
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actual notice.”172 In Brown, the decedent died in 1982.173 In 2014, the
decedent’s children sued the independent executor for breach of fiduciary
duty.174 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the execu-
tor on the ground that the statute of limitations had run because the chil-
dren were on inquiry notice of the alleged breaches in the early 1990s.175
The children appealed.176
The First Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.177 The children claimed
that the statute of limitations period should be tolled because of the exec-
utor’s alleged fraud and the application of the discovery rule.178 The court
of appeals explained that there are “two distinct doctrines that may delay
accrual of a claim or toll limitations: the discovery rule and fraudulent
concealment.”179 The court examined the evidence and agreed with the
trial court that the children should have discovered the potential claims
by the exercise of reasonable diligence decades before bringing suit.180
The court was unimpressed with arguments that the children lacked the
knowledge and skills to understand their potential claims because they
were raised in foster homes and that it would be unfair to deem them
having constructive notice of probate records.181 Likewise, the court de-
termined that the alleged fraudulent concealment could not bar the limi-
tations period because the alleged wrongs could have been discovered by
the children exercising reasonable diligence.182
P. AFFIDAVIT IN LIEU OF INVENTORY, APPRAISEMENT,
AND LIST OF CLAIMS
The 2019 legislature clarified that if the court grants an extension to file
the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims, it acts as an extension to
file the affidavit in lieu as well.183
Q. DIGITAL ASSETS
Personal representatives, including those who are independent, may at
any time prior to the closing of the estate request orders regarding access
to digital assets as authorized under the Texas Revised Uniform Fiduciary
Access to Digital Assets Act.184
172. Brown v. Arenson, 571 S.W.3d 324, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no
pet.) (quoting Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981)).
173. Id. at 327.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 327–28.
176. Id. at 328.
177. Id. at 336.
178. Id. at 330.
179. Id. at 332–33.
180. Id. at 334.
181. Id. at 333–34.
182. Id. at 336.
183. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.056(e).
184. Id. §§ 351.106 (dependent), § 402.003 (independent).
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R. CONTINGENT ATTORNEY FEES
In a dependent administration, court approval of a contingent attorney
fee is now required only if the fee exceeds one-third of the property
sought to be recovered.185
S. WILL CONTESTANT FEES
The court may now award costs, including attorney fees, to a successful
will contestant even if the contestant does not attempt to probate another
will.186
T. FUNERAL AND LAST ILLNESS EXPENSES
The amount of funeral and last illness expenses given Class 1 priority
treatment was doubled from a combined total of $15,000 to a maximum
of $15,000 for each type of expense.187
U. SALE OF REAL ESTATE
The 2019 legislature modernized the procedures for the sale of real es-
tate in dependent administrations where the testator did not grant a
power of sale in the will.188
V. WAVIER OF BOND
The 2019 legislature authorized the distributees of an estate that is in-
dependently administered to waive bond unless the court finds that the
waiver of bond would not be in the best interests of the estate.189
W. NOTICE BY PUBLICATION
When notice by publication is required, the notice must now also be
posted on the public information website maintained by the Office of
Court Administration under the newly enacted Texas Government Code
§ 72.034.190 The date of service is the earlier of the date posted on this
website or published in a newspaper.191
X. RESIDENTIAL LEASES
If a decedent who enters into a residential lease on or after January 1,
2020, is the sole occupant, and later dies, the personal representative may
now terminate the lease early and avoid liability for future rent.192 The
personal representative must (1) give the landlord timely notice of the
185. Id. §§ 351.152(a)–(b).
186. Id. § 352.052(c).
187. Id. § 355.102(b).
188. Id. §§ 356.401–.558.
189. Id. § 401.005(a-1).
190. Id. § 51.054(a); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 72.034.
191. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 51.054(b).
192. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.0162(a).
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termination of the lease; (2) remove the tenant’s property before the next
rent payment is due; and (3) provide an inventory of the removed prop-
erty if the landlord or the landlord’s agent makes a request for an inven-
tory.193 Regardless of the terms of the lease, the lease will be deemed
terminated on the later of (1) the thirtieth day following the notice to the
landlord, or (2) the date on which the statutory conditions were met.194
The estate remains liable for delinquent rent and damages to the prem-
ises up to the effective date of termination.195
IV. TRUSTS
A. TRUST INTENT
In ETC Texas Pipeline v. Addison Exploration, the Eleventh Eastland
Court of Appeals held that designating someone as a trustee does not
necessarily make the person a trustee unless the elements of a real trust
are satisfied.196 In a complex oil and gas case, one of the parties con-
tended that because another party was designated as a “trustee” in a con-
fidentiality agreement, it created a trust relationship that imposed
fiduciary duties on that party.197 The appellate court explained that
merely designating a party as a trustee does not create a trust.198 “For
there to be a valid trust, the beneficiary, the res, and the trust purpose
must be identified.”199 The court reviewed the provision in the agreement
and quickly determined that it did not identify any specific property to be
held in trust.200
B. MODIFICATION
In re Troy S. Poe Trust makes it clear that jury trials are available to
ascertain disputed facts in a trust modification action.201 The settlor ex-
pressly required the trustees to agree on all decisions.202 Unfortunately,
they were combatants in other litigation and were unable to agree on
several trust matters.203 One trustee obtained an order from the probate
court to make various modifications to the trust.204 The other trustee
appealed.205
193. Id.
194. Id. § 92.0162(b).
195. Id. § 92.0162(d).
196. ETC Tex. Pipeline v. Addison Exploration, 582 S.W.3d 823 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2019, pet. filed).
197. Id. at 830–31.
198. Id. at 840 (citing Nolana Dev. Ass’n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. 1984)).
199. Id. (citing Perfect Union Lodge v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748
S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1988)).
200. Id.
201. In re Troy S. Poe Tr., 591 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. filed).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 172–74.
204. Id. at 174–75.
205. Id. at 176.
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The Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals reversed.206 The court explained
that the trial court improperly rejected the other trustee’s request for a
jury trial because the question of whether the trust needed to be modified
was a fact question.207 Texas Property Code § 115.012 provides that the
normal civil procedure rules and statutes apply to trust actions.208 These
rules and statutes, along with the Texas Constitution, guarantee the right
to a jury trial.209 The trustee made a timely request for a jury trial (the
court held the failure to pay the jury fee did not forfeit the right to claim
error).210 The court rejected the claim that Texas Property Code
§ 112.054 precludes a jury trial on modification issues because it provides
that the “court shall exercise its discretion” in determining the modifica-
tions.211 The court examined the statute and found no reasonable argu-
ment that jury trials were precluded on fact issues.212 Instead, the court is
to use those factual findings in framing trust modifications.213 The court
also rejected arguments that (1) the grounds for modification were estab-
lished as a matter of law so that the lack of a jury was a harmless error,
and (2) the trustee lacks standing as the trustee was not a beneficiary of
the trust.214 The court then held that the probate court abused its discre-
tion in denying the trustee’s demand for a jury trial and reversed.215 Ac-
cordingly, the court did not determine whether the probate court’s
modifications were proper under Texas Property Code § 112.054.216
C. REFORMATION
1. Summary Judgment
A husband and his wife in In re Ignacio G. & Myra A. Gonzales Revo-
cable Living Trust created a trust naming their two children together as
beneficiaries.217 The summary section of the trust provided that each
would receive 50% of the trust when the last parent died.218 The wife’s
child from another partner, whom the husband adopted, attempted to
claim she was also a beneficiary of the trust because a later trust provision
indicated that “the remaining trust property shall be distributed to the
Grantors’ [_________].”219 The trust then provided an alternate gift “[i]f
none of the Grantors’ descendants survives the surviving Grantor.”220
206. Id. at 182.
207. Id. at 181–82.
208. Id. at 178.
209. Id. at 181.
210. Id. at 180.
211. Id. at 178.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 180–82.
215. Id. at 182.
216. Id.
217. In re Ignacio G. & Myra A. Gonzales Revocable Living Tr., 580 S.W.3d 322, 324
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. denied).
218. Id. at 324–25.
219. Id. at 325.
220. Id.
2020] Wills & Trusts 429
The trustee, one of the two mutual children, asserted that the drafter
meant for the word “descendants” to be inserted into the blank to be
consistent with the alternate gift.221 The other mutual child claimed that
only the two mutual children were beneficiaries based on the summary of
the trust.222 Testimony of the drafter of the trust, an attorney who was
disbarred a few years after drafting the trust, tended to show that the
settlors only intended their mutual children to be beneficiaries.223 The
trial court granted summary judgment reforming the trust by inserting the
word “children” into the blank and reforming later references to “de-
scendants” to “children.”224 The adopted child appealed.225
The Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed.226 Because the trial
court granted summary judgment, the appellate court began its analysis
under the assumption that the trial court determined the trust was unam-
biguous.227 While the court of appeals also recognized that although
Texas Property Code § 112.054(b-1)(3) allowing the reformation of un-
ambiguous provisions to correct a scrivener’s error was inapplicable,
prior Texas law would allow reformation nonetheless to correct a scriv-
ener’s error.228 The court explained that the trust obviously contained
scrivener’s errors but that the evidence was insufficiently strong to sup-
port a summary judgment.229 The evidence raised issues as to how the
trust was supposed to read, and thus a determination of the settlors’ in-
tent was a question of fact for a jury.230
2. Effective Date of Reformation
The 2019 legislature provided that a judicial reformation of a trust is
now deemed effective as of the date the settlor created the trust.231
D. HOMESTEAD AND “QUALIFYING TRUST”
An inter vivos trust into which homestead property is transferred must
strictly satisfy the requirements of a “qualifying trust” under Texas Prop-
erty Code § 41.0021(a) to retain homestead protection.232 This protection
allows a settlor or beneficiary to revoke the trust unilaterally, exercise an
inter vivos general power of appointment over the homestead property,
or use and occupy of the property as the settlor’s or beneficiary’s princi-
pal residence at no cost to the settlor or beneficiary (other than payment
of taxes and other specified expenses) for a permitted time period such as
221. Id.
222. Id. at 326.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 327.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 331.
227. Id. at 329.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 330.
230. Id. at 331.
231. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(c).
232. Id. § 41.0021(b).
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the life of the settlor or beneficiary.233 In In re Cyr, a bankruptcy case
from the Western District of Texas, the settlors’ trust did not meet these
requirements, and thus the property that otherwise would have been a
homestead had it not been transferred to the trust was not protected
when one of the settlors went bankrupt.234 For example, both settlors had
to act jointly to revoke the trust; the debtor (bankrupt) settlor could not
do so unilaterally.235
E. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE
In Waldron v. Susan R. Winking Trust, the trustee resigned, and the
alternate trustee declined to serve.236 The settlors anticipated this possi-
bility by providing a method for the beneficiary to fill the vacancy with a
bank or trust company.237 A problem arose because the beneficiary could
not locate a bank or trust company willing to serve as the trustee.238 Ac-
cordingly, the beneficiary acting pro se asked the court to appoint a speci-
fied individual as the trustee, and the court agreed.239 Approximately one
year later, the beneficiary asked the court to remove this trustee and ap-
point the beneficiary herself as the trustee.240 The trustee responded that
he was willing to resign as long as the court appointed a qualified trustee
and discharged him from liability by finding that he complied with the
terms of the trust.241 The court agreed with the trustee but refused to
appoint the beneficiary as the trustee and instead gave the beneficiary a
month to locate a qualified successor.242 The beneficiary located such a
person and asked the court to appoint her.243 Three days later, the benefi-
ciary filed a motion for a new trial contending that the court erred in,
among other things, ignoring the trust language stating that a trustee can
be terminated immediately.244 After additional court judgments, the ap-
pellate court’s determination that the court judgments were not final ap-
pealable orders, and an additional trial, the beneficiary again appealed
asserting that the court ignored the trust language regarding the benefici-
ary’s right to terminate a trustee immediately.245
The Twelfth Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed.246 The court of appeals
explained that because the trust did not provide for the eventuality that
no bank or trust company would accept the trust, the provisions of the
233. Id. § 41.0021(a).
234. In re Cyr, 605 B.R. 784, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2019).
235. Id. at 800.
236. Waldron v. Susan R. Winking Tr., No. 12-18-00026-CV, 2019 WL 3024767, at *1










246. Id. at *4.
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Texas Trust Code apply, which allow the court to appoint a successor on
the petition of any interested person.247 The beneficiary could not ap-
point a non-bank, non-corporate successor trustee.248
F. NON-WAIVABLE PROVISIONS
The 2019 legislature added to the list of items that the settlor cannot
alter the court’s ability to make an award of costs and attorney fees under
Texas Property Code § 114.064.249
G. WILL CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION RULES APPLICABLE
TO REVOCABLE TRUSTS
“[I]f a trust is created and amendable or revocable by the settlor, or by
the settlor and the settlor’s spouse,” the construction and interpretation
rules of Texas Estates Code Chapter 255 will now apply as if the settlor is
the testator and the beneficiaries upon the settlor’s death are devisees
unless the settlor provided otherwise.250 These rules apply only if the set-
tlor died on or after September 1, 2019.251 Settlors will need to consider
these issues when drafting trusts and include appropriate provisions ad-
dressing these issues in the same manner as they do in their wills. These
rules include:





• Exoneration of specific gifts;
• Exercise of power of appointment;
• Class gifts;
• Judicial modification or reformation; and
• Texas Estates Code § 355.109 dealing with abatement.
H. DECANTING
In a new provision often described as “cryptic,”252 the 2019 legislature
codified what it states to be the common law of Texas “that the second
trust to which trust assets are decanted may be created under the same
trust instrument as the first trust” from which the property comes.253 The
247. Id. at *3; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.083(a).
248. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.083(a).
249. Id. § 111.0035(b).
250. Id. § 112.0335(a).
251. Id. (effective Sept. 1, 2019).
252. See William D. Pargaman & Craig Hopper, Is There Meat in Those Beans? The
2019 Texas Estate & Trust Legislative Update, SAUNDERS, NORVAL, PARGAMAN & ATKINS,
LLP http://www.snpalaw.com/resources/2019LegislativeUpdate [perma.cc/R8GY-6EAC]
(last updated Jan. 20, 2020).
253. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.0715.
432 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 6
purpose of the amendment is to reduce the likelihood that trust assets
need to be retitled and perhaps allow the new trust to have the same tax
identification number as the original trust.254
I. DIVORCE
The 2005 legislature added Subchapter B to Chapter 123 of the Texas
Estates Code to address the situation of what happens if the settlor and
beneficiary of a revocable trust are divorced, and the settlor fails to
amend the trust to address this change in circumstance. The 2019 legisla-
ture copied these provisions into the Texas Property Code but did not
remove them from the Estates Code.255 The Property Code provisions
apply if the divorce occurred on or after September 1, 2019, but the Es-
tates Code provisions will apply if the divorce occurred on or after Sep-
tember 1, 2005. It did not matter when the settlor created the trust.
J. MANAGEMENT TRUSTS
The 2019 legislature enacted extensive provisions authorizing pooled
trust subaccounts for Chapter 142 Management Trusts.256
K. DIRECTED TRUSTS
The 2019 legislature clarified the status of trust protectors.257 By de-
fault, a trust protector is a fiduciary.258 However, the settlor may provide
that a protector acts in a nonfiduciary capacity if the advisor’s only power
is to remove and appoint trustees, advisors, trust committee members, or
other protectors provided the advisor does not use the power to appoint
the advisor’s self.259 Nonetheless, the protector may exercise a “power in
a nonfiduciary capacity as required by the Internal Revenue Code for a
grantor or other person to be treated as the owner of any portion of the
trust for federal income tax purposes.”260
V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. “BAD SPOUSE” STATUTE
After the decedent’s death in In re Estate of Durrill, his children used
Estates Code Chapter 123 to void their father’s marriage based on his
lack of capacity to enter into the marriage.261 Accordingly, the purported
spouse would not be treated as the decedent’s surviving spouse for any
254. See id.
255. See id. §§ 112.101–.106; see also TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 123.056.
256. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 142.010, 143.001–.007.
257. See id. § 114.0031(d).
258. Id. § 114.0031(e).
259. Id.
260. Id. § 114.0031(e-1).
261. In re Estate of Durrill, 570 S.W.3d 945, 948 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2019, no pet.).
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purpose, such as being an intestate heir and having the right to the survi-
vor’s homestead.262 The purported spouse appealed.263
The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals affirmed.264
The court found that all the statutory requirements were satisfied and
that the evidence was sufficient to show the decedent’s lack of mental
capacity to enter into a marriage on the date of the ceremony.265 In addi-
tion, the court rejected the claim that the decedent and the purported
spouse were common-law married before the ceremonial marriage, which
would have placed the marriage outside of the three-year period where
the spouses must enter into the marriage prior to death for the statute to
operate.266
B. TENANCY IN COMMON VS. JOINT TENANCY
Careful drafting of granting documents is necessary to be consistent
with how terms are used to eliminate any debate as to whether it creates
a tenancy in common or a joint tenancy with survivorship rights. For ex-
ample, a dispute arose in Wagenschein v. Ehlinger over the interpretation
of a deed which contained the following language: “THERE IS
HEREBY RESERVED AND EXCEPTED from this conveyance for
Grantors and the survivor of Grantors, a reservation until the survivor’s
death . . . . The reservation contained in this paragraph will continue until
the death of the last survivor of the seven (7) individuals referred to as
Grantors in this deed.”267 Does “survivor” refer to which of the seven
grantors outlives the other grantors, or does it refer to the grantor’s heirs
as being the beneficiaries of the reservation?
Both the trial court and Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of
Appeals held that the deed referred to the survivor of the actual grantors
and not to their surviving heirs.268 Although the deed also contained the
phrase “grantor’s successors,” reading the deed as a whole, this phrase
referred to the surviving grantors and not the grantor’s heirs.269 Accord-
ingly, the deed reserved a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in
the seven original grantors.270 Note that although this case involved a
deed, the same logic would apply to language in other granting docu-
ments such as wills and trusts.271
262. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 123.104.
263. In re Estate of Durrill, 570 S.W.3d at 955.
264. Id. at 963.
265. Id. at 955.
266. Id. at 960.
267. Wagenschein v. Ehlinger, 581 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2019, pet. denied).
268. Id. at 858.
269. Id. at 859.
270. Id.
271. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 101.002, 111.001(a).
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C. COMMUNITY PROPERTY SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT
A document labeled as one thing can be validated as a different type of
instrument under appropriate facts such as in In re Estate of Lovell.272 A
husband and his wife signed a non-holographic joint and mutual will by
using a form downloaded from the internet.273 However, they did not
have the will witnessed.274 After the wife died, her husband attempted to
probate the will.275 The wife’s son from a prior marriage successfully con-
tested the will because it was not witnessed.276 Thereafter, the husband
applied to have the same document adjudicated as a community property
survivorship agreement.277 The probate court determined that the docu-
ment met the requirements for a valid community property survivorship
agreement and declared that the husband was the owner of all of the
wife’s property.278 The wife’s son appealed.279
The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed.280 The wife’s son con-
tended that his mother and step-father intended to execute a will, and
thus it lacked the meeting of the minds necessary to create a community
property survivorship agreement under Texas Estates Code Chapter 112,
especially after the husband testified he had never heard of such an
agreement.281 The court explained that the terms of the document were
clear (each was to own all property of the other upon death) and it was
signed by both spouses as required by Texas Estates Code § 112.052.282
Although the precise language recommended in § 112.052(c) was not
used, it was clear that the spouses intended to create a survivorship right
in their community property.283 The court also rejected the wife’s son’s
claim that a document labeled as a “joint and mutual will” could not be
judicially turned into a community property survivorship agreement by
refusing to elevate form over substance.284
D. TRANSFER ON DEATH DEEDS
1. Statutory Forms
The 2019 legislature repealed the statutory suggested forms for creating
272. No. 05-18-00690-CV, 2019 WL 3423280, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 30, 2019, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
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and revoking transfer on death deeds.285 The Texas Supreme Court must
promulgate new sample forms.286
2. Conveyance Memorandum
A memorandum of conveyance recorded prior to the grantor’s death
will now void an otherwise valid transfer on death deed.287
E. DISPOSITION OF REMAINS
The 2019 legislature clarified that the designation of an ex-spouse as an
agent for the disposition of remains ends upon all types of marriage-end-
ing events (e.g., divorce, annulment, or court declaration that the mar-
riage is void) rather than only upon divorce.288 The statutory form was
revised to account for this change.289 If a dispute arises with respect to
the disposition of remains, the court with jurisdiction over the decedent’s
probate proceedings has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute even if pro-
bate proceedings have not already been commenced,290 which is normally
the case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new cases and statutes address a wide array of issues, some very
narrow and some with potentially broad impact. This article has already
discussed the practical application of many of the cases and statutes. It is
also important to understand some overarching principles that transcend
individual cases and form a pattern. Here are some examples of patterns
this author detected:
Poor drafting of wills, by attorneys or the testators themselves, is a
prominent cause for appellate litigation regarding the interpretation of a
will in Texas.291 Whether it be ambiguous or precatory language or the
omission of particular provisions the testator intended, prudent drafting
of an individual’s will is crucial to ensure that his or her intent is recog-
nized. When in doubt, the drafter should use well-established language or
take the time to define terms that have the potential to bring the intent of
the instrument into question.
285. Act of Apr. 11, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 337, § 3, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.; Act of
May 22, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1141, § 47, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (repealing TEX.
EST. CODE ANN. §§ 114.151, 114.152).
286. Act of Apr. 11, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 337, § 2, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (codi-
fied at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.020(b)(2-a)). Alternative forms are available at https:/
/texaslawhelp.org/form/transfer-death-deed [perma.cc/65SZ-4FGA].
287. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 114.102.
288. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002.
289. Id. § 711.002(b).
290. Id. § 711.002(k).
291. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ethridge, 594 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019,
no pet.); In re Estate of Silverman, 579 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, no pet.); Sullivan v. Hatchett, No. 07-17-00296-CV, 2019 WL 545578, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Feb. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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Using forms from the internet (or print resources) still requires careful
drafting and tailoring to the specific circumstances of the testator. This
holds especially true for the existing text on the form.
The unambiguous intentions of the drafter in an instrument (e.g., trust,
will, survivorship agreement) will have much weight even though the in-
strument is not in conformity with the appropriate law.292
292. See In re Estate of Lovell, No. 05-18-00690-CV, 2019 WL 3423280, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas July 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
